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There is an alarming indication that increasing attention in the I 
Pentagon is being directed toward removing basic roles and missions of 
the Armed Services from existing statute a..nd making them subject only 
to executive determination. 
Such a move is being advocated under the guise of "strengthening" 
the Secretary of Defense and "streamlining" the Defense Department. This 
may strengthen the executive agency. But it will weaken legislative authority 
and status in an area in which Congress has wisely and resolutely insisted 
on the exercise of its prerogative and responsibility since the founding of 
our country. 
What are these "roles and missions"? Briefly these constitute the 
specific provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, amended, which 
set forth the fundamental and basic roles and missions of each of the Armed 
Services. In a sense these provisions of law constitute a charter for each 
armed service, a kind of directive from Congress stating the purpose for 
which Congress, in accordance with its constitutional responsibility, creates, 
provides for, and maintains each of the armed services. 
It must be clearly understood that the statutory prescription of roles 
and missions is not a detailed statement of the specific day-to-day jobs, 
weapons, techniques, research projects and routine activities. Rather, 
roles and missions in law are stated in broad, flexible and elastic terms, 
which do not make this statutory assignment of roles and missions a straight-
jacket, a restriction, or an impediment to scientific and technological 
progress. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 39, Folder 35, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
I doubt if anyone today could prescribe in more fundamental and more 
flexible terms the roles and missions of the armed services as they were 
written into the National Security Act of 1947 with its subsequent amendment. 
It must be clearly understood that the roles and missions of the 
National Security Act are separate and distinct from the detailed assign-
ment of "functions" of the Armed Services. The functions of the Armed 
Services are the details of the jobs and duties of the Armed Services, stated 
in more specific terms than exists in law. Essentially, the functions, which 
are prescribed by the executive authority of the President or the Secretary 
of Defense, are adjustable from time to time to new techniques, new weapons, 
new scientific discoveries. Such functions are amplifications of the basic 
roles and missions prescribed by law. 
So, in the combination of the wording of the roles and missions in 
the National Security Act as written by Congress and the detailed, adjustable 
assignment of specific functions by the executive, there is a completely 
proper, workable, and successful device by which the legislative and the 
executive can exercise appropriate authority with respect to what the Armed 
Services are to do. 
This matter of statutory prescriptions of roles and missions is no 
new issue. In fact, it was probably the fundamental issue connected with 
the National Security Act of 1947. It certainly received more attention 
from Congress in its consideration of that bill than any other feature of 
that law. 
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I would like to briefly review some of the pertinent facts in connec-
tion with the inclusion of roles and missions in the National Security Act of 
1947, as amended. 
As originally proposed, the National Security Act of 1947 did not 
include the statutory outline of roles and missions. Rather, it was proposed 
that an executive order on roles and missions would be issued upon passage 
of the security act. However, Congress, in its wisdom, decided that it was 
not only the right of Congress to prescribe basic roles and missions for the 
Armed Services but it was an inescapable responsibility of Congress to so do. 
Such an attitude on the part of Congress was not readily accepted by the exec-
utive sponsors of the proposed national security act. Rowena,, Congress was 
resolute in its position and set forth in properly worded provisions the funda-
mental roles and missions of each of the Armed Services. 
I would like to point out that Congress, alert to the practical realities 
of defense matters, recognized that two elements of the Armed Services were 
in jeopardy. Because they considered those elements to be necessary to the 
attainment of a properly balanced defense organization and because such jeo-
pardy should not be permitted to continue, Congress was more precise in the 
prescription of roles and missions for naval aviation and the Marine Corps. 
Congress reaffirmed in even more emphatic terms, through Public 
Law 416, 82d Congress, 2d Session, its insistence upon a continued main-
tenance of a combat ready Marine Corps as a national force in readiness. 
Congress underlined its attitude and determination in this respect by stating 
that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should have coequal status with 
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' , 'Other members of the JCS in consideration of all matters pertaining to the 
Marine Corps and that, among other provisions, the Marine Corps should be 
maintained at a strength of three combat divisions and three air wings. 
It was perfectly obvious at that time that powerful factions within 
the Armed Services bitterly opposed this Congressional decision. 
There is not the slightest doubt in my mind but what the Marine Corps 
will be destroyed as a combat force in readiness if present effort:l'to remove 
II~ 
roles and missions from the law ill successful. There is no place for the 
~M' 
Marine Corps as it 1W developed, as Congress wants it, and as the country 
needs it, in the master plan of those who wish to centralize all military 
authority under somebody in the Pentagon. 
It is just as certain that our balanced naval power, with its unsur-
passed naval aviation, as well as its Marine landing forces, will be destroyed 
if the roles and missions are removed from statute. We will find the United 
States, which is in fact an island natiorx dependent upon maritime power for 
economic and military survival, possessing a Navy which no longer will con-
tain the unique American attribute of sea power -- the balanced fleet. 
This effort -- and it is a persistent one -- to remove roles and mis-
sions from law is not only a matter of military importance. It is of basic 
constitutional importance which is impossible to over- emphasize in matters 
of legislative - executive relationship. In a practical sense the statutory 
prescription of roles and missions is one of the few meaningful instruments 
by which Congress can discharge its proper responsibility with respect to 
defense policy. If roles and missions fur the Armed Services, as now pre 
scribed by law, are removed from existing statute and made subject to 
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executive whim, little will remain for Congress to do except appropriate 
monies for the Pentagon. 
This effort, which is gaining momentum within the Pentagon today, 
is one of the most fundamental issues of our times. Congress could not, 
and I predict will not, look lightly or casually upon attempts to divest Con-
gress of its authority and its responsibility to prescribe these basic roles 
and missions. Those persons who have, since 1947, refused to accept the 
decision of Congress to include roles and missions in the National Security 
Act must not be permitted to succeed with their efforts to undo this Congres-
sional decision. 
There has not, in recent years, been a more clearcut manifestation 
of a Congressional mandate in defense policies than the Congressional deter-
mination to prescribe roles and missions rather than leave it to the executive. 
I don 1t believe that Congress will permit this Pentagon power play to 
succeed. I do not believe that Congress and the American people will ever 
permit the Pentagon to erase the statutory safeguards that assures a continued 
existence of the Marines as an ever- ready combat force. 
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There has been much talk about the debilitating effects of 
inter-service rivalries. I would point out that while service rivalries -
have caused friction and waste, that rivalry in this sense should not be 
confused with service competition . Service competition has done much 
to uphold the morale of the services, and it has undoubtedly saved the 
country lives and dollars. There is a need for continued healthy 
service competition, but the lines should be drawn sharply so that honest, 
worthwhile endeavors to excel will not be compounded by efforts to 
eradicate and to place one service paramount to the others. 
I think there is much to be said in behalf of the continuation 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because, as a result of this, we have the 
best judgment of the combined thinking of the best men in all the services. 
If the joint chiefs of staff concept was to be done away with, it would mean 
that the alternative would be the creation of a single chief of staff or 
principal military advisor to the President who would, on the basis of his 
. single judgment as against the collective judgment of the joint chiefs of 
staff at the present time, be empowered to make decisions in behalf of 
the security of this country . This kind of substitution -this one-man 
judgment - should be avoided as much as possible. I think that, far 
better than breaking up the present system we have at this time, it would 
be in the interests of the nation and our security to bring about a 
reorganization within the Pentagon itself. 
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Parkinson's Law - the multiple additions to a civilian 
bureaucracy - is a classic illustration of what is happening in the 
Pentagon. It is my understanding that there are in excess of 30 assistant 
secretaries or their equivalent in the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of the Army, the Department of the Navy and the Department of the 
Air Force. These assistant secretaries have their assistants, and in 
addition to these there are numerous commissions and committees. 
Many of these civilians in the Pentagon can and do give directives to the 
military personnel stationed there, and they do so while the responsi-
bility rests not with them but with the officers to whom they issue or ders. 
The question of the coupling of authority with responsibility in the 
Pentagon is one which the Armed Services Committees of the Congress 
ought to investigate and make recommendations to correct. There are 
too many political appointees in the Pentagon who know too little about 
matters military. There are too many of these appointees who stay for 
too short a while, learn too little, and who accomplish little except to 
add to the disorder already prevalent throughout that building. Too many 
of these temporary civilian administrators try to formulate policy in all 
fields of defense and very likely too many of them, all too often, interfere 
when they should be minding their own business. 
In my opinion, it would be a good thing if the Armed Services 
Committee would look into the question of the chain of command and find 
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out, for example, just how many steps there are between the individual 
joint chiefs of staff and-the- ehai;wau o£ tee--;ohtt chiefs and the President 
of the United States or, for that matter, the Secretary of Defense. We 
find, for example, that in the New York Times of February 6, 1958, an 
article by Hanson W. Baldwin states that General Maxwell D. Taylor, 
Army Chief of Staff last September, said, "There are 19 civilian officials 
between the Army Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief who either 
command, control or influence his /the Chief of Staff's 7 conduct of the 
business of the Army." 
The civilian bureaucracy which has grown up in the Depart-
~1.1-v~.l' 
ment of Defense should be :Nwestigated. It is not a small policy-forming 
group superimposed on the separate services as was originally contem-
plated. It now numbers thousands of employees who do not confine them-
selves to policy, but who duplicate and confuse the work done by the 
individual services and who delve deeply into administration, operations 
and even command. It is time to streamline the Defense Department. 
It is time to take a look-see at this swollen civilian bureaucracy, and 
it is time to reduce the number of assistant secretaries and assistants 
to the assistant secretaries. It is time to find out what the numerous 
commissions and committees have been doing, and if they have been 
doing nothing, it is time to abolish them. It is time for a housecleaning 
not to the end that the Pentagon must be made an example of, but to the 
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end that greater efficiency, better organization and greater stability 
~- ,_:, c-L ~-1.,.£-.v~- 'l ,..;,.,..!~ 
1 ~mong the m.ili-ta.p.y can be established. It is time to do away with the 
political appointee and to put in his place the dedicated public servant. 
It is time to recognize that the Defense establishment in its proper 
sphere can and does make a contribution to our democracy. It is time 
to restore greater respect among and between the services, and it is 
N-~ ~,. ~-4--~~ c.&~ .,JJ::..,.. .... , 
time to give to our military leader7/{he functions which are supposedly 
nbes:x theirs under the laws of the land. 
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